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Bribery and corruption within Australian local councils 
 
 
Abstract: Despite widespread public attention towards corruption and bribery within local 
councils, extant research has failed to adequately investigate how corruption and bribery-related 
concerns are created or how bribery-related problems can be solved. This paper particularly 
focuses on Australian local councils to explore public concerns about corruption and bribery 
within the councils and provide possible guidance for policy makers to control bribery. A 
regulatory deficiency seems to be a major reason why local councils do not take appropriate 
anti-corruption or bribery measures. Therefore, regulators need to impose radical and 
mandatory requirements, especially reporting requirements, on local councils.   
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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore concerns regarding and possible measures to address 
corruption and bribery within Australian local councils. Australian local councils face 
several challenges in curbing corruption and bribery. Academic studies do not firmly 
show how corruption and bribery-related concerns are created or how corruption and 
bribery-related problems can be solved. While research has been published on bribery 
within corporations (see for example Dissanayake et al., 2012; Islam et al., 2013), 
research looking at corruption and bribery and related control measures within the 
public service sector is scant. Indeed, there needs to be more investigations into the 
nature of corruption and bribery and associated control measures within public service 
sector organisations such as local councils.  
 
Public service sector organisations vary from the corporate sector in that their aims are 
typically manifold and complex (Lewis, 2008). Public services are also increasingly 
perceived by policy makers to be as important as the corporate sector in the context of 
wider economic and social development (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008); there is 
increasing public concern regarding the misuse of public resources by public service 
organisations such as local councils. To have well functioning local councils that 
deliver quality public services consistent with community preferences, and that foster 
sustainable growth while managing fiscal resources prudently, is considered critical to 
local councils’ mission for social welfare development in Australia. Over the last two 
decades the central focus of accounting research within this field has moved from a 
public sector analysis to a public service focus, which reflects that the source of supply 
of services is now more mixed (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008); the issues of 
transparency and anti-corruption accountability have become the central focus around 
public services. Although several new areas of interest have arisen in this field, 
including management accounting practices, social and environmental matters, and 
governance and intellectual capital (Broadbent and Guthrie,  2008), bribery or 
corruption have not been a focus.  
 
Within Australian local councils, there is growing research that focuses on broader 
perspectives of accounting, accountability and reporting practices (see for example, 
CPA 2007, 2005; Keating, 2002; Barrett, 2004; Ryan et al., 2007). Prior research  
documents findings, from increasing demands from stakeholders for greater 
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transparency and accountability (CPA, 2007) to a lack of accounting standards and 
standard setting bodies to address contemporary accountability problems within local 
councils (Ryan et al., 2007). Despite widespread public concern about bribery, there is 
a lack of research that focuses on how local councils can address concerns over bribery 
and corruption within their own organisations. This research fills in some of the gap.  
 
Major public concern over bribery and corruption within Australian local 
councils 
Public concern over bribery and corruption in Australian organisations is increasing. 
For example, according to KPMG’s Forensic Fraud Survey (2006), 47% of 465 
Australian organisations had experienced at least one instance of bribery (KPMG, 
2006). Bribery and corruption have the potential to threaten a range of Australian 
government interests, including Australia’s international reputation, international social 
and economic development, national and international financial security, and national 
financial integrity (Australian Government, 2012; 2010). For Australian managers, 
bribery and corruption emerges as a major ethical dilemma confronting them in their 
organisational operations (Pedigo and Marshall, 2009).  
 
Concerns of major anti-corruption bodies  
The role of Australian local councils has evolved from the ‘core’ local government 
services such as ‘roads, rates and rubbish’ to encompass broader roles in governance, 
advocacy, service delivery, recreation, building, health, planning and development, and 
community services [(Local Government National Report (2008-2009), Local 
Government National Report, 2006)]. By definition, Australian local councils are 
essential for the protection of public utilities and resources for the welfare of entire 
communities. The present situation, whereby corruption and bribery is systemic within 
many councils,  poses a huge risk to community interest. The New South Wales (NSW) 
Independent Commission Against Corruption documents  examples of the nature of 
bribery and corruption experienced in NSW local councils (ICAC, 2012): 
• an employee providing confidential information to a tenderer/contractor  
resulting in an unfair advantage; 
• a procurement officer owning/managing a private company that produces 
goods/services relevant to their agency’s operations and submitting tenders to 
the agency without declaring this interest;  
• two tenderers colluding with one submitting a ‘dummy’ bid and one a genuine 
bid; and 
• an employee colluding with a contractor to falsify or inflate invoices. 
 
The ICAC, the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), the Western 
Australian Corruption Crime Commission (CCC) and Transparency International (TI) 
have been campaigning for, and providing guidelines to, increase the capacity of 
council managers to counter bribery and corruption within their organisations. Despite 
this, local councils continue to experience a greater incidence of corruption and bribery 
than any other state agencies (ICAC, 2010). The ICAC’s findings show that within the 
local council sector in NSW, staff at 110 local councils (72% of total 152 councils) 
have received kickbacks and bribes (Wells, 2011). The ICAC’s findings suggest that 
the mere adoption of policies will not safeguard an organisation against the insidious, 
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pervasive web of corruption by kickbacks of various kinds (Wells, 2011; Bajkowski, 
2012). A series of investigations run by the ICAC have revealed many examples of 
bribery and corruption within local councils (see 
www.icac.nsw.gov.au/investigations/past-investigations). Some examples include:  
• Wagonga Local Aboriginal Land Council: allegations that between March 2005 and 
April 2006, Ron Mason (former chairperson of the Wagonga Local Aboriginal Land 
Council) and Ken Foster (former coordinator of the Council) received corrupt 
benefits in return for facilitating negotiations (2012), 
• City of Canada Bay Council: an allegation that Hedley Higgs, Manager of City 
Services at the City of Canada Bay Council, accepted payments from contractors 
engaged to conduct work for the Council, in return for showing favour to those 
contractors in the course of his time with the Council (2010), 
• Wollongong City Council: allegations that former and current officials of the 
Wollongong City Council and developers engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to 
the assessment of development applications (2008). 
The above examples of bribery and corruption within local councils provide evidence 
for the urgent need for effective measures and strengthening of regulation to prevent, 
detect and counter bribery and corruption within the delivery of public services in 
Australia. 
 
Media attention towards corruption and bribery within Australian local councils 
To further explore concerns about corruption and bribery within Australian local 
councils, news media articles referring to corruption and bribery in local councils have 
been reviewed and documented1 
 
The graph illustrates the amount of news media articles on bribery and corruption within 
Australian local councils which were reported within the leading Australian news media 
between 2004 and 2010. All the data collected via the Dow-Jones  FACTIVA database was 
based on Australian news media including  The Sydney Morning Herald, Sunday Telegraph, 
The Age,  The Australian, The Australian Financial Review and ABC news. 
As shown in Figure 1, media attention towards corruption and bribery within Australian local 
councils has significantly grown in recent years.  In 2004 there were only 4 cases of bribery 
and corruption published in the news media.  A year later, the figure dropped to a low of 2 
news articles reported and remained constant until 2007. It then started to show a relatively 
small increase of 8 articles to record a total of 10 articles in 2008. In 2009, the number 
increased to 52 articles with a difference of 40 articles followed by a significant increase to 
271 articles in 2010. In the year of 2011, news media experienced a further increase of 23 
                                                          
1 A research assistant, using the Dow-Jones FACTIVA database, collected news media coverage on corruption 
and bribery occurring in  Australian local councils. The FACTIVA database was used to collect media  articles 
reported within the major Australian news media including  The Sydney Morning Herald, Sunday Telegraph,  
The Age, The Australian, The Australian Financial Review and ABC news. The researcher also assisted with 
documentation of data from annual reports by two Australian local councils, which are analysed in the next 
section.   
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news articles to reach a peak of 294 articles being reported in 2011 and ending the period 
slightly lower than the prior year, at 272 articles. The increased amount of media attention 
concerning bribery and corruption within Australian local councils corroborates with the 
public concern demonstrated in the ICAC’s study (ICAC, 2010; ICAC, 2012 and its own 
website).  
 
Figure 1: Media attention towards corruption and bribery within Australian local 
councils 
  
 
Variations of local councils’ responses to corruption and bribery related allegations: two 
cases   
To understand public responses to corruption and bribery allegations against Australian local 
councils, public disclosures by two local councils, as examples, were reviewed. They include 
Wollongong City Council (whose officials were accused of corruption and bribery in 
2007/2008) and City of Canada Bay Council (whose manager was accused of bribery in 
2010).  
 
As shown in Table 1, Wollongong City Council’s annual reports from 2006 to 2012 were 
reviewed, and found to include an explicit anti-corruption policy. The Council also responded 
to allegations of corruption by inviting the ICAC to investigate. However, details of the 
investigation results were not found within the annual reports.  
 
 
The City of Canada Bay Council’s annual reports from 2006 to 2012 were reviewed and 
found to have no anti-corruption policy included. This Council did not address corruption and 
bribery at all in its publicly disclosed materials. Additionally, there was no disclosure of what 
actions were taken in response to bribery allegations against the Council’s manager in 2010.  
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Table 1 Local councils’ responses to corruption and bribery related allegations: two cases   
Year Corruption/bribery Incidents  Anti-corruption/bribery policy  Acknowledgement of 
bribery/corruption  incidents 
City of Canada 
Bay Council 
Wollongong 
City Council 
City of Canada 
Bay  Council 
Wollongong City 
Council 
2006  No incident no yes n/a n/a 
2007  no yes n/a n/a 
2008 Wollongong City Council: allegations that 
former and current officials and 
developers engaged in corrupt conduct in 
relation to the assessment of development 
applications (2008). 
 
no yes no Yes 
(in particular  ICAC 
was invited to 
investigate the 
corruption case)    
2009 No incident no yes no yes 
2010 City of Canada Bay Council: an 
allegation that the Manager of City 
Services accepted payments from 
contractors  (2010), 
 
no yes no n/a 
2011 No incident no yes no n/a 
2012 No incident no yes no n/a 
 
 
 
The review of public disclosures by Wollongong City Council and the City of Canada Bay 
Council suggests that both the existing anti-corruption measures and related disclosures, and 
accountability, were inadequate. These are just two of many examples which are consistent 
with the findings by the ICAC (ICAC, 2010; Wells, 2011) that there is a general lack of 
policy implementation across NSW local councils to curb corruption and bribery.  The ICAC 
also has concerns over inferior policy and internal control systems that encourage bribery and 
corruption to occur (ICAC, 2010). From this perspective, the findings from the review of 
annual reports (highlighted in Table 1) resonate with the findings by the ICAC.  
 
 
Motivation for bribery and corruption and possible anti-bribery/corruption guidance  
 
Brief overview of motivation for bribery and corruption within Australian local councils 
The motivation for bribery and corruption within Australian local councils can be seen from 
Cressey’s (1953)2 fraud triangle lens. Regardless of the many ways (bribery and corruption is 
one way) to commit fraud , there are generally three common elements and they make up 
what is known as the fraud triangle (Cressey 1953; Albrecht et al.,  2012, p. 34). These are 
perceived pressure (financial, vices (e.g. drugs, alcohol, gambling), work or other), perceived 
opportunity (wider scope to commit fraud, conceal fraud or avoid being punished, for 
example, weak policy or internal control systems may create the scope to commit fraud) and 
rationalisation (being able to justify the fraud in some way, for example, ‘I am underpaid by 
my  employer’ ).  
                                                          
2 Although Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle is dated, researchers still find the relevance to explain contemporary 
frauds (within accounting literature, see for example Dellaportas, 2013; Srivastava et al., 2009). Most 
importantly, little is still known about the phenomenon of the Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle within the local 
council and in this paper the fraud triangle provides useful insights to understand corruption and bribery within 
the Australian local councils.   
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Diagram 1 The fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) 
 
Of these elements, eliminating opportunity is the most important although minimising 
pressure and rationalisation should not be underestimated (Albrecht et al., 2012, p.51).  Most 
importantly, without opportunity, the fraud cannot occur (Albrecht et al., 2012).Of Cressey’s 
triangle, it is the manifestation of opportunity for corruption and bribery to occur undetected 
that is the most relevant to this paper, as curbing the scope of this opportunity can be 
controlled. The key opportunities created within Australian local councils can be attributed 
to:  
a) Inadequate screening of employees. This allows dishonest individuals to come into an 
organisation (as per the examples of bribery by local council managers highlighted in the earlier 
section); 
b) Inadequate internal policy framework and control systems for effective corruption and bribery 
detection. The regulatory bodies such as the ICAC have found that weak policy framework and 
policy implementation by local councils allows corruption and bribery to take place; 
c) Inadequate fraud awareness training. It was  evident from the review of two councils’ annual 
reports and the ICAC’s documents that lack of employee commitment is one of the reasons for 
bribery and corruption;  
d) Weak regulation of local councils in Australia, despite international and national guidelines to 
eliminate corruption and bribery. In particular, the absence of a separate accounting regulatory 
body for local councils (Ryan et al, 2007) gives weak signals to the sector which can lead to 
manipulation, fraud and corruption; 
e) A lack of mandatory reporting requirements. As evidenced from the cases discussed earlier, 
there appears to be a widespread variation of bribery and corruption reporting by local councils. 
In particular, the absence of adequate disclosure of anti-corruption and anti-bribery policy and 
related actions can further stimulate bribery and corruption.  
 
Possible guidance to control bribery and corruption within local councils 
If regulators and government or policy makers expect to control bribery and corruption 
within local councils, they have to eliminate the scope of opportunity for corruption and 
bribery. Some preventive measures are discussed next.  
 
Effective control of corruption and bribery broadly ranges from an appropriate “tone at the 
top” robust recruitment process to fraud awareness training and effective internal controls at 
an operational level. Within an organisation, a perceived opportunity for corruption and 
bribery exists when an individual believes internal controls can be overridden (because that 
individual is in a position of trust or has specific knowledge of weaknesses in internal 
controls), there is an ineffective monitoring of management and complex organisational 
structure, and there is scope for subjective accounting judgments. While Australia has 
extensive corporate governance mechanisms for the protection of corporate shareholders 
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particularly via the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council, in the case of 
public service sector management, corporate governance is yet to be explicitly defined.  
There is a lack of sound governance mechanisms that recognise the diversity of objectives in 
the public service and the diversity of stakeholders and the need for integrity, honesty and 
high standards of propriety and probity given the stewardship of public funds.  To achieve the 
goal of providing a variety of stakeholders with services in the public interest, public service 
organisations such as local councils must incorporate good governance and effective internal 
control policies and procedures to curb bribery and corruption.   
 
Prior studies also document findings, from increasing demands from stakeholders for greater 
transparency and accountability (CPA, 2007) to a lack of accounting standards and standard 
setting bodies to address contemporary accountability problems within local councils (Ryan 
et al., 2007). Therefore transparency, accountability and availability of adequate accounting 
standards within local councils are also essential strategies for curbing corruption and 
bribery.   
 
Within public service sector management, annual reports are viewed as the cornerstone of 
local council accountability (Ryan et al., 2002). There is a need for a public sector accounting 
body to guide the public service sector (including local council) financial reporting 
requirements (Ryan and Mack, 2007), as well as to deliver more precise standards and 
measures to solve contemporary organisational problems including bribery and corruption. 
Ryan et al., (2002, p.278) states:  
If the degree to which accountability is rendered through annual report disclosures can be 
reliably measured, then the issues which need to be addressed in order to improve 
accountability disclosures can be more meaningfully investigated, both by academics and 
public policy practitioners who are responsible for the integrity of accountability mechanisms  
In an attempt to explore whether local councils adopt anti-bribery and corruption policies 
within their own organisations, annual reports by two councils (see Table 1) were reviewed.  
The researcher found that policies and procedures in the areas of anti-corruption and bribery 
are inadequately addressed in annual reports. The annual reports also revealed a lack of 
adequate responsiveness by local councils to allegations of bribery and corruption. The 
imposition of mandatory reporting requirements on local councils including disclosure of 
policy, procedure and responsiveness to bribery and corruption is necessary as a preventive 
measure.  
 
As discussed earlier, local councils do not disclose adequate amounts of anti-corruption and 
bribery policies and measures. There is also a marked absence of adequate anti-bribery and 
corruption guidelines within Australian local councils. In the absence of effective local anti-
bribery and corruption standards, there are a number of international governmental 
organisations (IGOs) that seek to counter corrupt practices at both local and national levels. 
Some IGO anti-corruption guidelines are documented in Table 2. 
 
Globally, a number of IGOs, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), TI, and the World Bank are actively 
involved in developing and implementing various anti-bribery guidelines. These guidelines 
mainly focus on: (1) Accounting for Combating Bribery/Corruption; (2) Board and Senior 
Management Responsibilities; (3) Building Human Resources to Combat Bribery/Corruption; 
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(4) Responsible Business Relations; and (5) External Verification and Assurance. IGOs 
expect organisations to visibly address their guidelines. Therefore, disclosures of anti-bribery 
and corruption measures  and related accounting practices is of paramount importance for 
organisational transparency and accountability within both global and local settings.   
 
Table 2: Major anti-bribery guidelines by IGOs  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)3: 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the 1997 revised recommendations; 
In 2000, Anti-Bribery Convention recommendations on export credit and credit guarantees which state that 
governments are obliged to take action to deter and sanction bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business supported by official export credit. 
United Nations (UN):  
Tenth Principle of the United Nations Global Compact launched on July 2000; 
In 2003, the General Assembly adopted the UN designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption 
day; 
UN Convention against Corruption entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
World Bank: 
Adopted new Governance and Anti-Corruption strategy in March 2007 including seven principles to fight 
global corruption.  
World Economic Forum: 
Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACE) 2010. 
TRACE International : 
Anti –bribery compliance program and Anti-bribery risk assessments 2001. 
Transparency International (TI)4: 
Introduced the “Corruption Fighters’ Tool Kit”- civil society experiences and emerging strategies in 2001 
and later in 2002, and 2004 make new edition: 
TI first launched Annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 1995 but in 2010, TI introduced more 
advance CPI which measured the perceived level of public sector corruption in 178 countries around the 
world; 
 Bribery Payers’ Index (BPI) was introduced in 1999 which evaluate the supply side of corruption; 
 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) was launched on 9 December 2010 which is a survey that assesses 
general public attitudes toward, and experience of corruption in, dozens of countries around the world.  
Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF): 
 PTF’s Citizens Against Corruption Program (CAC) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make this 
effective. It is the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the 
bribery transaction. The 34 OECD member countries and four non-member countries - Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, and South Africa - have adopted this Convention (OECD, 2011, www.OECE.org/ home page). In 
2010, the OECD approved “Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying” representing the first 
international policy instrument to provide guidance for policy-makers on how to promote good governance 
principles in lobbying (OECD, 2011, www.OECE.org/ home page). 
4  Transparency International (TI) is the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption. 
Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI raises 
awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and works with partners in government, business and civil 
society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it (p.17). (TI, 2009): 
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Conclusion  
This paper identifies some of the key motivations for and possible corrective measures to 
address corruption and bribery within Australian local councils. The opportunity for bribery 
and corruption to take place within councils has been linked by an important anti-corruption 
commission, the ICAC, to weak policy framework. There is also evidence that a lack of 
managerial commitment and low levels of adequate disclosures of anti-corruption policies 
and related actions by local councils further stimulates incidences of bribery and corruption. 
In particular, the absence of a separate accounting regulatory body for local councils (Ryan et 
al., 2007) gives weak signals to the sector which can lead to manipulation, fraud and 
corruption. Despite growing public concern generated by media attention towards allegations 
of corruption and bribery, there is a lack of adequate responsiveness by local councils to 
address such concerns.   
 
Australian local councils need to implement effective measures and reposition their 
organisations to be able to detect and prevent bribery and corruption.  Good governance with 
effective internal control policy and procedure is prerequisite for prevention of bribery and 
corruption. Closely tied with good governance, transparency, accountability and availability 
of adequate accounting standards within council management structures has become 
imperative in curbing bribery and corrupt practices. While annual reports are viewed as the 
cornerstone of local council accountability, adequate responsiveness within these reports to 
allegations of corruption and bribery would ensure that appropriate standards of transparency, 
accountability and good governance are met. Regulators also need to impose mandatory and 
adequate reporting requirements on local councils to guarantee that anti-corruption policies 
and measures are disclosed. In the absence of adequate anti-corruption standards, there are a 
number of IGOs that focus on fighting corruption at the local and country level. Despite this, 
policies are weak and bribery-related corrective measures are not yet sufficiently advanced. 
 
With increasing dissatisfaction with local councils’ performance and public concerns relating 
to this (including parliamentary concerns about bribery), the Australian people have perhaps 
never been in greater need of a detailed understanding of the ongoing challenges and 
intractable problems they (the councils or the wider Australian community) face. This paper 
provides a base for further research to explore new and in-depth insights into reasons for 
bribery and how to prevent it.  Further research is required to enhance knowledge that is 
expected to be of lasting significance to accountability theories and regulatory policies within 
Australian local councils. As a final point, there is a need for attention to be paid to the issue 
of bribery and corruption in other nations (including developing nations) as lessons can be 
learned from the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
References 
 
Albrecht, W. S., Albrecht C. C., Albrecht C.O., and  Zimbelman M. F., 2012. Fraud Examination. 4th  
ed., South Western. 
Australian Government. 2012. How does corruption affect Australia’s national interests? The 
Commonwealth’s approach to Anti-Corruption, Australian Government, 2012, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Crimepreventionandenforcement/Corruption/Documents/Anti-
Corruption%20Discussion%20Paper%20FINAL%20PDF%20-%2015%20March%202012.pdf) 
Australian Government.2010. Foreign Bribery: Factsheet 1’, viewed on 24/06/2011 at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE09780
1FF)~n0000sheet+1.pdf/$file/n0000sheet+1.pdf 
Bajkowski, J. 2012. New corruption scandal hits 14 NSW councils, viewed on 12/12/2012 at 
www.governmentnews.com.au/2012/10/29/article/New-corruption-scandal-hits-14-NSW-
councils/NLXXJEMMGB 
Barrett, P. 2004. Public Sector Reporting and Triple Bottom Line, Department of the Environment 
and Heritage Seminar Series, 24 August, 2004. 
Broadbent J. and Guthrie J. 2008. Public Sector to Public Services: 20 years of ‘Alternative’ 
Accounting Research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21 (2):129-169.  
CPA.2005. Sustainability reporting: practices, performance and potential, CPA Australia: Melbourne 
(Vic), pp. 114. 
CPA.2007.Sustainability reporting in local government: systemic change or greenwash? CPA 
Australia, Viewed at:  http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/cps/rde/xbcr/cpa-site/sustainability-
reporting-in-local-government.pdf 
Cressey, D.  1953. Other people's money; a study in the social psychology of embezzlement, Free 
Press, Glencoe, IL, . 
Dellaportas, S. 2013. Conversations with inmate accountants : motivation, opportunity and the fraud 
triangle. Accounting forum, 37(1):29-39. 
Dissanayake, T, Islam, M.A. and Dellaportas, S. 2012. Corporate Disclosure on Combating Bribery: 
A study of Two Global Companies in the Telecommunication Industry, (presented  at a 
symposium on (Re)defining the Forensic Accountant: Merging Practice, research and 
Education: The second national Forensic Accounting Teaching and research Symposium, 12-
14 February, 2012, University of Wollongong. 
ICAC.2012. Procurement, NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), viewed on 12/12/12 at 
www.icac.nsw.gov.au/preventing-corruption/knowing-your-risks/procurement/4305. 
ICAC.2010. ICAC survey shows local government more vulnerable to corruption than state agencies, 
viewed on 02/12/2012 at http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/article/3620 
Islam, M.A., Cooper, B. and  Haque, S. 2013. Corporate governance environment and anti-corruption 
disclosure: evidence from Australia’, AFAANZ conference, Perth, July 6-9.. 
Keating, T. 2002. The greening of local councils, https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/links?724_3073 
KPMG.2006. Forensic fraud survey-2006, KPMG, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com.au/Portals/0/FraudSurvey%2006%20WP(web).pdf 
Local government national report.2006. Department of Transport and Regional Services, 2006, 
AGPS: Canberra, pp. 355. 
Local Government National Report.2008-2009. Australian Government, Department of Regional 
Australia, Local government, Arts and Sport, see at 
http://www.regional.gov.au/local/publications/reports/2008_2009/LGNR_2008-09.pdf 
Lewis, T. 2008. Debate: Public Sector Sustainability Reporting—Implication for Accountants, Public 
Money & Management, 28 (6): 329-331. 
OECD.2009. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and Related Documents, OECD Publishing. 
OECD.2011. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746, en_2649_34859 
2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
11 
 
Pedigo, K..L. and Marshall, V. 2009. Bribery: Australian managers’ experiences and resources when 
operating in international markets. Journal of Business Ethics,  87:59-74. 
Ryan, C. Trevor A., and Nelson, M. 2002. Accountability Disclosures by Queensland Local 
Government Councils: 1997-1999. Financial Accountability and Management, 18 (3): 261-289. 
Ryan, C.  and Mack, J. 2007. Is there an audience for public sector annual reports : Australian 
evidence? International Journal of Public Sector Management, 20, 2, pp. 134-146. 
Ryan, C., Guthrie, J, and  Day, R. 2007. Politics of financial reporting and the consequences for the 
public sector. Abacus: A Journal of Accounting, Finance, and Business Studies, 43 (4): 474-487. 
Srivastava, R.P. Mock, T.J. and Turner, J.L.  2009. Bayesian fraud risk formula for financial 
statement audits. Abacus: A Journal of Accounting, Finance, and Business Studies 45 (1): 66-
80. 
TI.2009. Business Principles for countering Bribery: A Multi-stakeholder initiative led by 
Transparency International, Berlin. 
Wells, J. 2011. ICAC probe told of 'pervasive web of corruption,  updated Tue Oct 4, 2011, ABC, 
viewed at:  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-10-04/icac-hears-of-nsw-council-
corruption/3208446 
 
 
 
 
 
